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PROFESSIONALISM, POSTMODERN ETHICS AND THE GLOBAL 
STANDARDS FOR SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION AND TRAINING  
Vishanthie Sewpaul 
INTRODUCTION 
The Global Standards for Social Work Education and Training (hereafter referred to as “the 
document”) that was adopted by the General Assemblies of the International Association of 
Schools of Social Work (IASSW) and the International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW) 
in October 2004 was born out of several small and big compromises. As Chair of the Global 
Standards Committee, I remain ambivalent about some of the processes and the product. As 
pointed out previously (Williams & Sewpaul, 2004), despite the best attempts at consultation 
and ensuring representation of different voices, they remained flawed, especially when working 
on a document that is supposed to cover worldwide processes and representation. On being 
asked to Chair the Global Standards Committee my reaction was that it was a preposterous and 
over-ambitious goal, with my biggest fear being that it would reinforce a Western hegemony 
and reproduce Western professional imperialism in social work education and practice. I was 
informed that because I understood the sensitivities and complexities of such an endeavour, I 
would be suited to lead the process.  
We began with consultation with colleagues across the globe (see Sewpaul & Jones, 2005 for 
details) on open questions such as: Should IASSW and IFSW engage in developing global 
standards for social work education and training? What did colleagues think about the idea of 
developing such standards? What might the purpose of such standards be? What sort of content 
should be included in such a document? What might the advantages of such standards be? 
What might the potential disadvantages be? Might such standards reinforce a Western 
hegemony?  
I initially believed that my task would be an easy one – that the majority of our colleagues 
would reject the very idea of global standards and that I would write a report to IASSW 
indicating this and that my task would end there. To my surprise, however, apart from a few 
dissenting voices, the majority of those consulted enthusiastically embraced the idea. Thus 
began a four-year exciting but arduous process of developing the standards. For David Jones 
(who co-chaired the Committee as a representative of IFSW) and I, who were ultimately 
responsible for putting together the document, the task was an unenviable one. We had to make 
sense of directives and requests from different ends of the continuum. Some colleagues 
indicated that for such standards to have meaning, we must be specific enough to include 
prescribed reading1, credits and number of hours of study! On the other extreme, there were 
those who said there should be no standards whatsoever. The mandate, though, from the 
majority, in between the extreme ends of the spectrum, was that IASSW and IFSW develop 
standards that were broad enough to fit any context, but specific enough to be truly meaningful!  
                                              
1
 I conjured up images of huge tensions and contests among European, American and Australian social workers 
[who currently dominate the literature base of social work] vying for first position in the prescription of texts on 
a global level! Given Western hegemony and the presumed superiority of the Global North and West, it would 
have been most unlikely that the marginalised voices of colleagues from the Global South and the East would 
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Through long hours of reflection, reading and dialogue with colleagues and friends, the idea 
finally gelled that we could have global standards (with the acknowledgement that the 
development of standards is inherently modernist in nature) recast within a postmodernist 
framework (Williams & Sewpaul, 2004), and to have the standards framed as aspirational 
tenets rather than as narrow minimum standards that might jeopardise some schools of social 
work, especially in the developing world. In this article I revisit some of the modernist 
assumptions underlying the Global Standards document in relation to the notions of 
professionalism and codes of ethics. This is preceded by a brief elucidation of some of the key 
components of the document. I conclude with a critique of modernist assumptions of moral 
certainly founded in external rules and codes, and I call for “being for the Other” (Levinas, 
cited in Bauman, 1993) to be considered an ethical imperative in social work. 
KEY COMPONENTS OF THE GLOBAL STANDARDS DOCUMENT 
Acknowledging some of the criticism and limitations of the international definition of social 
work2 (Sewpaul & Jones, 2005; Yip, 2004), the document accepted the definition as it was 
adopted by the IFSW and IASSW as a point of departure. The Standards are located in 
alignment with the core purposes of social work, which range from advocacy, social activism 
and policy formulation to the protective and direct service delivery functions of the social 
worker. The first purpose reads: Facilitate the inclusion of marginalised, socially excluded, 
dispossessed, vulnerable and at-risk groups of people.3  
The footnote to the first core purpose is characteristic of the document. It is extensively 
footnoted as we had to emphasise that certain concepts and words might have different 
meanings in different contexts. The document consistently iterates the importance of 
considering historical, political, socio-economic and cultural context-specific realities. The core 
purposes themselves stirred some controversy, even from colleagues within the same context. 
For example, while one colleague from Sweden saw the core purposes as too radical and 
claimed that if social workers worked toward them, they would be a threat to the system and be 
imprisoned, while another from Norway expressed the view that the core purposes were far too 
conservative. 
The document (Sewpaul & Jones, 2005) reflects a set of nine broad standards, each of which 
contains detailed sub-standards. The nine sets of standards relate to:  
1) The school’s core purpose or mission statement;  
2) Programme objectives and outcomes;  
3) Programme curricula, including fieldwork;  
4) Core curricula including the domains of: the social work profession; the social work 
professional; methods of social work practice and paradigm of the social work profession;  
                                              
2
 The definition reads: “The social work profession promotes social change, problem solving in human 
relationships and the empowerment and liberation of people to enhance well-being. Utilising theories of human 
behaviour and social systems, social work intervenes at the points where people interact with their environments. 
Principles of human rights and social justice are fundamental to social work”. It is currently under review, with 
IFSW and IASSW engaging in consultative processes to this end.  
3
 Such concepts lack clear definition. Persons who fall into the categories of being “marginalised”, “socially 
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5) Social work professional staff;  
6) Social work students;  
7) Structure, administration, governance and resources;  
8) Cultural and ethnic diversity; and  
9) Values and ethical codes of conduct for social work. 
Given that the development of standards, by the very nature of standards, generally tends to fall 
within a prescriptive, reductionist, logical-positivist paradigm, efforts were made to adopt an 
alternative and a more empowering, non-prescriptive language in developing the global 
standards. The main aim was to enhance social work education, training and practice on a 
global level by facilitating dialogue within and across nations and regions. The document 
reflects standards that schools of social work should consistently aspire towards which, 
collectively and if met, might provide for quite sophisticated levels of social work education 
and training. The document has served to stimulate much debate, dialogue, research and 
publications from colleagues in different parts of the world – a desired outcome of the 
initiative. However, there are drawbacks, as discussed below. 
PROFESSIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD IN SOCIAL WORK 
Social work was historically rooted in the ethos of caring, with early philanthropy being 
infused with religious injunctions to provide services for the most disadvantaged and 
marginalised members of society (Sewpaul, 2005). With industrialisation and urbanisation and 
the growing threats that the poor and unemployed represented to the elite, social work became 
inscribed with control functions and with protection of the middle class (Clarke, 1993). Born 
within the period of modernity, despite its competing strands with the Settlement House 
Movement of Jane Addams (Ife, 1997), social work began to take on the omniscient voice of 
science (Franklin, 1986; Howe, 1994; Ife, 1997). It is within this positivist scientific paradigm 
and culture of cure and control that the discipline of social work has seen its most pronounced 
development, but this has been a double-edged sword.  
From its inception social work sought its legitimacy from other older professions such as 
medicine, law and theology. Abraham Flexner, who was considered a leading authority in 
medical education, identified specific criteria by which occupations might be distinguished 
from professions and at the 1915 National Conference of Charities and Corrections he 
concluded that social work was not a profession. “Professions engage in intellectual operations 
involving individual responsibility, derive their material from science and learning, work this 
material up to a practical end, apply it using techniques that are educationally communicable, 
are self-organised, and are motivated by altruism” (Flexner, cited in Popple, 1985:561). Mary 
Richmond challenged Flexner’s view in 1917 through the publication of her book Social 
Diagnosis, which valorised casework that was modelled on the medical paradigm (Franklin, 
1986) with its pathology-based focus on diagnosis, cure and control. Richmond was rewarded 
with an Honorary Masters degree for “establishing the scientific basis of a new profession” 
(Franklin, 1986:516). Thus, Volz (cited in Sewpaul & Holscher, 2004:31) asserted, social work 
“[learned] the language of the powerful, those who matter and create identities, and [inscribed] 
itself into the legitimate and legitimising narratives of ‘science’ [and] progress”. Sewpaul and 
Holscher (2004:31) go on to argue that “social work adopted with the language of ‘skills’, 
‘techniques’ and ‘diagnosis’ a modern conceptualisation of its relationship with its clientele as 
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gained over its early alternatives (e.g. community-based initiatives via the Settlement House 
Movement) may be attributed to its ability to emulate the prevailing professional and scientific 
discourses of the time (Franklin, 1986). Social work aped the natural sciences in its striving for 
recognition, status and professionalism. 
The earlier version of the title of the document (Sewpaul & Jones, 2004) read “Global 
standards for social work education and training”. The final version of the document as it 
appears in the International Journal of Social Welfare (Sewpaul & Jones, 2005) reads: “Global 
Standards for the Education and Training of the Social Work Profession”. During the process 
of developing the standards, our colleagues in the field of social pedagogy expressed concern 
that the document did not accommodate them as a separate entity and that it did not embrace a 
language that was inclusive of social pedagogy. In response to this the following was included 
in the earlier document, with respect to the universal-particular debate: “ … given the 
profession’s historically fragmented strands; the contemporary debates around social work’s 
intra-professional identity; its identity vis-à-vis other categories of personnel in the welfare 
sector such as social pedagogues, development workers, child care workers, probation officers 
and youth workers (where such categories of personnel are differentiated from social work); 
and the enormous diversities across nations and regions, there was some scepticism about the 
possibility of identifying any such ‘universal’” (Sewpaul & Jones, 2004:503, my italics). We 
were of the view that this would have taken care of the concerns of the social pedagogues. 
However, at the Board meetings of the IFSW and IASSW in October 2004 in Adelaide, our 
social pedagogy colleagues were still dissatisfied. They agreed to the document being put 
forward for adoption at the General Assembly of IASSW on condition that the language that 
they provide will be incorporated into the review to reflect the inclusion of social pedagogy.  
After many follow-up requests and delay, our social pedagogy colleagues responded asking for 
one major change throughout the document – that the title be altered from “Global standards 
for the education and training of social work” to “Global standards for the education and 
training of the social work profession” and that all references to “social work” in the document 
be changed to read “the social work profession”. This called for a huge ideological shift. The 
dominant notion of professionalism – as opposed to the still marginalised postmodernist, 
emancipatory and feminist views on non-hierarchal, egalitarian relationships; worker 
involvement; subjectivities and relational ethics – derives from modernity’s positivist 
embracing of factors such as detachment in “social worker-client” relationships, neutrality, the 
social worker as expert, aspirations toward scientific standards of truth, experimentation, 
universal laws, and the separation of the professional from the person. With regard to the latter 
point in particular, Bauman asserts:  
[...] it does not always feel like that at all; not all stains incurred on the job – “in the 
course of the role performance” – stay on the work clothes alone. Sometimes we have the 
unsavoury feeling of some of the mud spilling on our body, or the fatigues sticking to our 
skin too tight for comfort; they cannot be easily peeled off and left behind the locker [...] 
Away from mere “role playing”, we are indeed “ourselves”, and thus we and we alone 
are responsible for our deeds. (Bauman, 1993:19) 
The discomfort about respecting the views and recommendations from our social pedagogy 
colleagues was acute. However, having made the promise to accept the language that they 
provided meant that neither IASSW nor IFSW could go back on a principled decision. But in 
keeping our promise to the social pedagogues, mainly our counterparts from Denmark, we 
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and we angered some of our colleagues in Asia and other developing parts of the world, where 
social work is not yet seen to be a fully fledged profession. The title and the continuous 
references to “the social work profession” speaks to a betrayal of our consultation processes in 
that they minimised the voices of colleagues from the developing world and reflect a European, 
Western hegemony – precisely what we sought to guard against at all times! Akimoto (2007), 
for example, commented specifically on the document’s emphasis on professionalism, asserting 
that it represented a Western unipolarity in social work education.  
Yet, as Sakaguchi and Sewpaul (2009) indicated, the issues are more nuanced and complex. 
They point out that developing countries are often complicit in their emulation of the West, just 
as social work is complicit in trying to emulate the logical-positivist rationality of the natural 
sciences in its striving for status, prestige and professionalism. In comparing social work 
education across Japan and South Africa in relation to the global standards, Sakaguchi and 
Sewpaul conclude with the following:  
All too often there is deference to the West as the gold standard. The complex systems 
of standards development and accreditation both in SA and Japan are Western 
imports; yet both countries appear to have enthusiastically and unreservedly acceded 
to the demands of Western professional legitimizing. Perhaps therein lay the crunch 
with the Global Standards, the international definition and the international code of 
ethics, all of which represent a universalizing discourse around what excellent social 
work ought to be. If IASSW and IFSW are perceived to be the authorized truths, then 
might it not become a self-imposition that national endeavours emulate global 
aspirations? (Sakaguchi & Sewpaul, 2009:8).  
There is a pattern in the literature that reflects a general paradox with Asian and African 
scholars critiquing Western hegemonic discourses, yet – all too often – embracing concepts, 
definitions, models and theories that derive from the West (Sen, 2005; Sewpaul, 2007). The 
voluntary co-option of developing countries into the dominant paradigms of the West is also 
reflected in the Global Standards with regard to ethical codes. Given the drive toward 
professionalism and that subscribing to a code of ethics is viewed as a core component of a 
profession, this standard was included in the document. In the following section the taken-for-
granted assumption that codes of ethics contribute to ethical conduct is questioned. A particular 
focus of attention is the interrogation of the place of codes of ethics in relation to personal 
morality and “being for the Other” (Levinas cited in Bauman, 1993).  
POSTMODERN ETHICS AND CODES OF ETHICS  
Bauman (1993:3, my italics) asserts that the “postmodern approach to ethics consists […] not 
in the abandoning of characteristically modern concerns, but the rejection of the typically 
modern ways of going about its moral problems (that is, responding to moral challenges with 
coercive normative regulation …). The great issues of ethics – like human rights, social justice 
[…] – have lost nothing of their topicality. They only need to be seen, and dealt with, in a novel 
way”. This accords with Leonard’s (1999:14) thesis that postmodernism is “a cultural and 
political critique of the present […] perhaps postmodernity is best understood as simply the 
latest stage of modernity in which we look back, from the present, and are critical in a new way 
about the trajectory by which we arrived at the present”. 
Bauman (1993:9) goes on to argue that “the moral thought and practice of modernity was 
animated by the belief in the possibility of a non-ambivalent, non-aporetic ethical code”. 
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of modernity. Hence Bauman’s (1993:10) cogent assertion that “The foolproof – universal and 
unshakably founded – ethical code will never be found […] a non-aporetic, non-ambivalent 
morality, an ethics that is universal and ‘objectively founded’, is a practical impossibility; 
perhaps also an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms”. The complexities of moral dilemmas that 
we face in our contemporary world cannot be dealt with by a reliance on ethical codes.  
Yet in continuation of modernity’s great projects of perfecting the performance of nature along 
progressively rational lines (science) and judging human conduct (ethics) (Howe, 1994), codes 
of ethics abound in social work, with IFSW having it as one of the pre-requisites for affiliation. 
It has become a taken-for-granted assumption that such codes constitute the cornerstone of 
professionalism and that they enhance ethical conduct. In accordance with such a norm, the 
Global Standards document details requirements in respect of ethical conduct, registration of 
social workers and disciplinary measures to be taken against social workers should they violate 
the codes of ethics (Sewpaul & Jones, 2005). Bauman (1993:20) speaks of our reliance on rules 
and how this detracts from individual responsibility. “Relying on the rules has become a habit, 
and without the fatigues we feel naked and helpless […], we miss responsibility badly when it 
is denied to us, but once we get it back it feels like a burden too heavy to carry alone”. Citing 
Erich Fromm, Bauman (1993:20, my italics) concludes that “in our effort to escape from 
aloneness and powerlessness, we are ready to get rid of our individual self either by submission 
to new forms of authority or by compulsive conforming to accepted patterns”. Bauman (in 
Bauman & Tester, 2001:51) contends: “If freedom is a value, it is also an utterly ambivalent 
one. It attracts and repels at the same time”. Following the rules and codes might in some 
instances produce more harm than good. Under apartheid and Nazi Germany, for example, 
many atrocities against humanity were committed by those who did the bidding of the state and 
followed the rules and codes of conduct to perfection.  
The details with regard to ethical codes vary across countries. Sakaguchi and Sewpaul (2009) 
detail the differences in approach regarding registration of social workers and the coercive 
approaches used in disciplinary action in South Africa compared with that of Japan. They 
conclude that this does raise the question about the role and place of codes of ethics with 
respect to the moral impulse (Hölscher & Sewpaul, 2006; Husband, 1995). Do or can such 
codes ensure ethical conduct? Should we presume that the absence of disciplinary practices in 
Japan contributes to less ethical practices among Japanese social workers? It might be argued 
that regulatory disciplinary measures reinforce the system-stabilising functions of social work. 
In South Africa, for example, a social worker might be called up for disciplinary action if an 
individual case is not followed through, or if case records are not properly kept. There is no 
such threat for social workers who do not challenge the structural barriers that maintain people 
in poor, unemployed and unhealthy circumstances. Social work’s normalising function has 
remained its defining feature across the globe and through decades. Inevitably ethical tensions 
arise from social work’s positioning as mediator between the powers that be and those who are 
marginalised (Sewpaul & Hölscher, 2004).  
These tensions are rooted in the contradiction between the profession’s moral legitimacy which 
is derived from empathetic, dialogical and democratic relationships that may emerge in 
encounters with service users, and from an understanding of the impact of structural factors on 
people’s lives, and from its societal legitimacy, which is derived from fulfilling social work’s 
ameliorative and normalising functions (Hölscher & Sewpaul, 2006). The latter favours social 
workers who are disengaged and ignorant of structural forms of injustice and oppression. It 
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personal attitudes of citizens” (Epstein, 1999:7). The former calls for critical reflection on the 
exact nature of those structures that marginalise social work’s service users and on social 
work’s complicity in this regard. From a system-stabilising point of view, it makes sense to 
regulate and monitor the profession so as to ensure the handiwork is done and to reduce the 
notion of ethical practice to merely following pre-formulated codes and rules (Hölscher & 
Sewpaul, 2006). 
The neoliberal and new managerial onslaught in social work is manifest in an increasing 
production and dissemination of quality standards, codes of ethics, procedural manuals and 
assessment schedules. These have contributed to shifts from possible constructionist, 
emancipatory and radical approaches in social work to resource management, cost-efficiency 
and administration (Sewpaul and Hölscher, 2004). The result is “at best … bureaucratic 
practice … and at worst … defensive practice” (Banks, 2001:154-155).  
The South African (SA) Code of Ethics (www.sacssp.co.za) – a 72-page document which 
reinforces morality as nothing other than a social contract – leaves no room for ambivalence, 
ambiguity of being, freedom to deal with ethical plurality and the messiness of real life (as 
postmodern ethicists would call for) as it even legislates on love! In what it refers to as “dual 
relationships” the SA Code reads: 
The social worker should not be involved in relationships that compromise the social work 
relationship. If such a dual relationship develops or is discovered after the social work 
relationship has been initiated, the social worker should terminate the social work 
relationship in an appropriate manner. He/she should notify the client in writing of the 
termination, assist the client to obtain services from another social worker and should not 
engage in any self-enhancing relationship with the client until at least twenty-four months 
has lapsed after the termination.4 [My italics] 
The above is an example of our search for moral certainty in prescriptive rules and codes as 
opposed to Bauman’s call to re-personalise morality. Given the prescriptive code and 
regulations of the South African Council for Social Service Professions (SACSSP) and the 
disciplinary functions that it serves, it is not surprising that social workers are reluctant to rely 
on their own judgments and that they turn to the SACSSP for guidance and rules as to how to 
perform their day-to-day tasks. Out of fear of making mistakes and being called up for 
disciplinary action, there are social workers who want the SACSSP to tell them what to do and 
how to do things under specific circumstances. This sets in motion a vicious cycle – the more 
social workers do this, the more prescriptive the code and the regulations of the SACSSP 
become; the more prescriptive the code becomes, the greater the fear among social workers, 
and the greater the fear, the more the deference is shown to the SACSSP for rules of conduct. 
The more a social worker relies on the external code, the less likely he/she is to rely on his/her 
own sense of morality, thus making them less likely to struggle and work through complex 
moral dilemmas and ethical decision-making. Yet, as Bauman (1993:34) asserts, it is “personal 
morality that makes ethical negotiation and consensus possible, not the other way round”. Thus 
Bauman calls on us to deal with ambiguity of being and on our willingness to be for the Other, 
as the centre of postmodern ethics – the benefits of which he describes as follows:  
                                              
4 This does mean, for example, that if a social worker falls in love with a client and is willing to give up his/her 
job to pursue the relationship, he/she cannot do so for two years following the termination of the social work 
relationship. It also raises questions about what happens if the “client system” is a community – does this 
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Acceptance of contingency and respect for ambiguity do not come easy; there is no 
point in playing down their psychological costs. And yet the silver lining for this 
particular cloud is uncommonly thick. The postmodern re-enchantment of the world 
carries a chance of facing human moral capacity point-blank, as it truly is, undisguised 
and undeformed; to readmit it to the human world from its modern exile, to restore it to 
its rights and dignity; to efface the memory of defamation, the stigma left my modern 
mistrust […] Perhaps starting from there […] will even make the hope of a more 
humane world more realistic. (Bauman (1993:34) 
CONCLUSION 
Williams and Sewpaul (2004) acknowledged that the specification of criteria in the Global 
Standards document, albeit in the form of ideals to be aspired toward, falls within a 
reductionist, modernist mode of thinking. In writing the article Williams and I asked the 
following question: “Are we in modernist fashion continuing the ‘discourse of legitimation’ 
(Lyotard, 2003:259) in respect of the status of social work?” Five years down the line and with 
the benefit of hindsight, I believe the Global Standards document might be serving this end. In 
the appendix to the document Sewpaul and Jones (2005:227) claim that: “The document is not 
intended to be a fixed timeless product; it is a dynamic entity subject to review and revision as 
and when the need arises.” The discourse on legitimation may not in itself be the problematic; 
it is the modernist discourse on legitimation and all that it has come to mean in relation to 
logical-positivist rationality, professionalism and codes of ethics, as I discuss in this paper, that 
require critical interrogation, and it is perhaps time to revisit some of the inherent modernist 
assumptions underlying the Global Standards document.  
Given the birth of social work during the period of modernity with its emphasis on reductionist 
logical-positivist rationality, it is not surprising that it took on this dominant discourse in the 
pursuit of status and professionalism. To this end we have seen codified systems of ethics, the 
move towards greater standardisation and competencies development (Dominelli, 1996, 2004), 
systems of accreditation, and a proliferation of managerial and market discourses in welfare 
(Dominelli, 2004; Ife 1997; Sewpaul & Hölscher, 2004) and an increase in the development 
and use of professional jargon. It is these concerns that dogged me at the inception of 
formulating the Global Standards, and they continue to bother me when I reflect on some of the 
processes and the final product of the Global Standards. 
Rather than having a code of ethics as the normative in social work, should we not be asking 
the following questions: Is the source of ethical practice within or outside the self? Does the 
question itself pose a false dichotomy? Is the relationship between the internal and external 
origins of morality more complex than it appears? How do we make sense of Kant’s view that 
freedom of self (the rational autonomous self) is the precondition of moral action, as opposed to 
Levinas’s view that freedom of self is the product of moral responsibility to the Other which, 
according to Bauman, is inherently irrational? This does raise the question of autonomy versus 
obligation to the Other as the foundation for everyday ethical practice. Rather than having a 
prescriptive codes of ethics with regulatory and coercive mechanisms, might social work not 
benefit from a few broad statement of principles that provide greater space for critical 
engagement and dialogue about issues that produce ethical dilemmas in our daily practice? 
Instead of our emphasis on external codes of ethics, should we consider making responsibility 
for, and “being for” the Other (Bauman, 1993; Bauman & Tester, 2001) normative in social 
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of minimising and patronising the Other in social work relationships? The appeal of such an 
approach lies in Bauman’s (1993) assertion that the moral self accords the unique Other that 
priority assigned to the self. The justification for the self, for Levinas (cited in Bauman, 1993), 
begins with the Other; our responses to the call of the Other define us. Thus Bauman’s 
emphasis on meeting with the stranger – the Other as Face – not as persona, the mask worn to 
signify the role played. Drawing on the ethical theory of Levinas, Bauman concludes: 
The Face is not a force. It is an authority. Authority is often without force […] The 
absolute nakedness of a face, the absolutely defenseless face, without covering, clothing 
or mask, is what opposes my power over it, my violence […] By herself the Other is 
weak, and it is precisely that weakness that makes my positioning of her as the Face a 
moral act: I am fully and truly for the Other, since it is I who gave her the right to 
command, make the weak strong, make the silence speak, make the non-being into being 
through offering it the right to command me. “I am for the other” means I give myself to 
the Other as hostage [...] It is I who take the responsibility [without a contract or 
obligations] […] My responsibility, which constitutes, simultaneously, the Other as the 
Face and me as the moral self, is unconditional. (Bauman, 1993:73-74)  
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